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Abstract 
This article considers the legality of Australia’s second TPV 
regime (introduced by the Migration and Maritime Powers 
Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) 
Act 2014 (Cth)) under the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and accompanying International Human Rights Law 
instruments. It is argued that the current regime suffers from three 
defects. First, it unlawfully interferes with the rights of refugees to 
mental and physical health, and to family reunification. Second, 
the policy is unlawfully discriminatory pursuant to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (read with the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). Third, as a result 
of these conclusions, TPVs constitute unlawful penalties under the 
Refugee Convention. The result is that for Australia’s domestic 
regime to comply with its protection obligations under 
international law, Australia must significantly amend its asylum 
seeker and refugee policy.  
I  Introduction 
According to Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, ‘it is for international law … 
to substitute its own protection for that which the [refugee’s] country of 
origin cannot or will not provide’.1 The necessary counterpart to this 
aphorism, aspirational as it may be, is that State signatories to the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees  2 must abide by their 
international law protection obligations to refugees. This article analyses 
one important facet of Australia’s onshore refugee program,3 the 
Temporary Protection Visa (‘TPV’), within the framework of critically 
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1  Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 421. 
2  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 
UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugee Convention’) as amended by the 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 
UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (‘Refugees Protocol’). 
3  This refers to the program by which asylum seekers who physically arrive in Australian 
territory are processed. 
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assessing Australia’s treatment of refugees with respect to its 
international law protection obligations.4 
TPVs are three-year visas with limited social and economic 
entitlements that are granted to unauthorised asylum seekers entering 
Australia,5 when officially ‘recognised’ as refugees. The three-year visas 
are ostensibly aimed at deterring irregular maritime migration to 
Australia.6 The first TPV regime, introduced in 1999, was abolished in 
2007 after extensive socioeconomic and legal criticism.7 Nonetheless, the 
Abbott Government was successful in legislatively reintroducing TPVs in 
late 2014.8 TPV’s may be contrasted with the permanent visas available 
to authorised asylum seekers pursuant to Australia’s offshore refugee 
program, and refugees who seek asylum after entering Australia on valid 
visas. 
Australia’s use of temporary protection for recognised refugees must 
be distinguished from the conventional use of temporary protection as a 
complementary or interim protection mechanism, offering short-term 
group-based protection where individual assessment under the Refugee 
Convention is both impractical and untimely.9 When used in the 
                                                
4  In this article the term ‘refugee’ is used to describe any person to whom Australia owes 
protection obligations, whether by reason of the Refugee Convention or the complementary 
protection regime. 
5  For the purposes of this article, ‘unauthorised’ asylum seekers are those who seek to enter 
Australia without prior authorisation. That is, those who seek to enter the country without a 
valid visa. ‘Authorised’ asylum seekers are those who arrive with visas after being selected 
as part of the offshore refugee program. Quite apart from this binary group are refugees who 
apply for asylum after entering Australia on a valid visa. 
6  This is subject to one qualification. As will be explained below, TPVs are also granted to 
select unauthorized air arrivals. 
7  See below Part III. Key publications include Savitri Taylor, ‘The Human Rights 
Implications of the Psycho-Social Harm Caused by Australia's Temporary Protection 
Regime’ (2005) 11(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 8; Greg Marston, Temporary 
Protection, Permanent Uncertainty: The Experience of Refugees Living on Temporary 
Protection Visas (RMIT University, 2003); Greg Marston, ‘A Punitive Policy: Labour Force 
Participation of Refugees on Temporary Protection Visas’ (2004) 15(1) Labour & Industry 
65; Don McMaster, ‘Temporary Protection Visas: The Bastard Child of the One Nation 
Party!’ (Paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, 
University of Adelaide, 29 September 2004) 
<https://www.adelaide.edu.au/apsa/docs_papers/Aust%20Pol/McMaster.pdf>; Fethi 
Mansouri and Michael Leach, Lives in Limbo: Voices of Refugees under Temporary 
Protection (University of New South Wales Press, 2004). The Legal and Constitutional 
References Committee has referred to the ‘considerable cost in terms of human suffering’ of 
TPVs: Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Administration and Operation of the Migration Act 1958 (2006) 252 [8.33]. 
8  Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy 
Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth). This Act made many changes to Australian immigration and 
refugee law. Many of these changes, such as the new ‘fast track’ assessment process and the 
codified definition of a refugee, raise a number of issues regarding Australia’s compliance 
with its obligations under international law. This article is specifically concerned with the 
re-introduction of TPVs. 
9  Fethi Mansouri and Michael Leach, ‘The Evolution of the Temporary Protection Visa 
Regime in Australia’ (2009) 47(2) International Migration 101, 101; Alice Edwards, 
‘Temporary Protection, Derogation and the 1951 Refugee Convention’ (2012) 13 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 1, 11. 
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conventional sense, temporary protection has a great deal of support from 
academics and the UNHCR,10 but when used as a ‘diluted substitute 
protection for Convention refugees’ it is seen as a threat to the Refugee 
Convention itself.11 Given the increasing use of temporary protection in 
this way by Western States, the arguments in this article are also relevant 
outside the Australian context.12 
Crock and Bones have recently reviewed the historic use of temporary 
protection, and reflected on what a Refugee Convention-compliant 
regime could look like.13 This article goes further, and critically examines 
the legality of the second TPV regime under the Refugee Convention and 
accompanying International Human Rights Law (‘IHRL’) instruments. 
While there is no express prohibition on temporary protection in the 
Refugee Convention,14 this article considers three ways in which 
Australia’s second TPV regime is, nonetheless, inconsistent with 
Australia's protection obligations under the Refugee Convention and 
other IHRL instruments. In the absence of enforceable human rights 
norms to ensure the basic rights of refugees,15 it is especially important 
that Australian law, policy and practice reflect Australia’s obligations 
under the Refugee Convention and other IHRL instruments. 
This article considers three potential inconsistencies between the 
second TPV regime and Australia’s international law obligations, and 
examines whether the regime is consistent with some of the wider human 
rights norms that are protected by IHRL. It will be argued that Australia’s 
use of TPVs constitutes unlawful discrimination pursuant to the Refugee 
Convention and IHRL, and that TPVs may constitute an unlawful penalty 
under the Refugee Convention.  
                                                
10  See, eg, Pirkko Kourula, Broadening the Edges: Refugee Definition and International 
Protection Revisited (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997) 104–110; Stephen H Legomsky, 
Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy (Foundation Press, 4th ed, 2005) 1164–83. 
11  A term coined in Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a 
Formalized Regime’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 279, 280. 
12  Temporary protection is already used in this way by Denmark, Germany, the United States 
and New Zealand. Taylor has also noted that ‘the rhetoric of all Western States increasingly 
emphasises that repatriation is preferable to all other durable solutions’: Taylor, above n 7, 
4. 
13  Mary Crock and Kate Bones, ‘Australian Exceptionalism: Temporary Protection and the 
Rights of Refugees’ (2015) 16(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 522.   
14  Manuel Angel Castillo and James C Hathaway, ‘Temporary Protection’ in James C 
Hathaway, Reconceiving International Refugee Law (Kluwer Law, 1997) 1, 2; Fitzpatrick, 
above n 11; James C Hathaway, ‘The Meaning of Repatriation’ (1997) 9(4) International 
Journal of Refugee Law 551. The UNHCR has supported the use of temporary protection in 
the conventional sense, and the need for durable solutions to be achieved for refugees: 
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) (1979): Refugees Without an Asylum 
Country; Executive Committee Conclusion No. 19 (XXXI) (1980): Temporary Refuge; 
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 90 (LII) (2001): Conclusion on International 
Protection, para.(j). 
15  The Australian position may be compared with the human rights norms contained in the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) 
(‘ECHR’). 
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II  History of TPVs in Australia 
A  First TPV Regime 
Although Australia had used conventional temporary protection for a 
number of years prior,16 the original TPV regime (at least in terms of a 
departure from the conventional use of temporary protection)17 was 
formally introduced by the Howard Government in October 1999.18 The 
Government relied on the need to preserve humanitarian resettlement 
places for more deserving offshore refugees awaiting protection in other 
countries, and the deterrence of ‘unlawful’ onshore arrivals.19 TPVs were 
granted to asylum seekers entering Australia without a valid visa, who 
were subsequently recognised as refugees. After 30 months, they were 
able to apply for a permanent protection visa (‘PPV’).20 PPVs were only 
available at first instance to offshore refugees who were awaiting 
protection in other countries, or those who entered Australia with a valid 
visa. 
Substantial legislative amendments were made in late September 
2001, after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Tampa incident.21 
These amendments implemented two changes. First, they prohibited the 
issuance of a PPV to any refugee who, since leaving their home country, 
                                                
16  In 1990, the Hawke Government introduced temporary humanitarian protection visas in 
response to the massacre at Tiananmen Square: Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 102. The 
Migration Regulations 1989 (Cth) contained two categories of visa of present importance: 
the Refugee A (restricted) visa or entry permit (reg 116) and the Refugee B (restricted) visa 
or entry permit (reg 117). The validity of these visas was restricted to four years by the 
Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1990 (Cth). Subsequently the Migration Regulations 
(Amendment) 1991 (Cth), which took effect from 27 February 1991, introduced into the 
Migration Regulations 1989 (Cth) two new categories of visa: the domestic protection 
(temporary) entry permit (reg 117A) and the domestic protection (temporary) visa (reg 
118A). Each lasted for only four years. This regime, with certain changes, continued until 
1993. 
17  The temporary protection regime used by the Hawke Government in the 1990s (described in 
the previous footnote) is not addressed in this article. Australia’s use of temporary protection 
at that time was more conventional, and broadly in line with ‘some of the thinking about 
temporary protection that was occurring internationally, with an emphasis on sudden and 
large-scale influx’: Crock and Bones, above n 13, 9. It has been said that it ‘reflected a 
standard use of temporary protection, offering short-term group-based protection’: Mansouri 
and Leach, above n 9, 102. The regime introduced in 1999 by the Howard Government, on 
the other hand, was unparalleled when considered in light of comparative international 
practices. It was driven by domestic political concerns and had an ‘overt focus on deterrence 
rather than the management of asylum seekers’: Crock and Bones, above n 13, 10. The 2014 
regime is of a similar character. This article is restricted in scope to these more exceptional 
TPV regimes. It is in that sense that it refers to the ‘first’ and ‘second’ TPV regimes. 
18  This was done by the introduction of visa subclass 785 (temporary protection), the ‘TPV’: 
Migration Amendment Regulations 1999 (No. 12) (Cth); Janet Phillips, Temporary 
Protection Visas (Research Note No. 51, Parliamentary Library, 11 May 2004) 1.  
19  Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 104. 
20  Ibid 105–7. 
21  See, eg, Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth); Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth); 
Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth). 
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had resided for seven days or more in a country where they could have 
sought and obtained protection (the ‘seven day rule’).22 Such refugees 
were only eligible for a further TPV after the expiration of their original 
TPV.23 Second, the amendments excised certain Australian territories 
from the migration zone (‘excised offshore places’),24 with the result that 
asylum seekers arriving at these territories (‘offshore entry persons’) were 
ineligible for any type of visa in the absence of an exercise of ministerial 
discretion (a ‘statutory bar’).25 Instead, offshore entry persons were 
removed to detention centres offshore and processed (either in Nauru or 
Manus Island, Papua New Guinea).26 The only mechanism by which 
asylum seekers who were processed offshore could be considered for re-
entry to Australia was a three-year temporary humanitarian visa (‘THV’) 
(visa subclass 447) for offshore entry persons. After its expiry, the asylum 
seeker was, absent ministerial approval, only eligible for a further TPV.27  
Offshore processing and TPVs, when combined with the excision of 
Australian territories from the migration zone and Operation Relex 
(interception at sea), constituted the Howard Government’s infamous 
‘Pacific Solution’.28 As Crock and Ghezelbash have noted, ‘there can be 
no doubt that the policies of interdiction, excision and offshore processing 
were successful in reducing the number of unauthorised boat arrivals 
between 2002 and 2005’.29 When the Rudd Government came to power 
after the federal election of November 2007, there were almost no boats 
arriving.30 That election brought with it the next major change,31 when the 
Rudd Government committed to restoring the integrity of the migration 
                                                
22  Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 sub-clauses 200.212, 202.212 and 204.213; Janet 
Phillips, ‘Temporary Protection Visas’ (Research Note No 51, Parliamentary Library, 
Parliament of Australia, 2004) 1; Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 105–8. 
23  Phillips, above n 22, 1; Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 105–8. 
24  To date, the entire Australian mainland has been excised from the migration zone. This is 
further discussed below. 
25  Pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46A, which was introduced by the Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth); Mansouri and Leach, above n 
9, 105–7. 
26  Pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 198A, which was introduced by the Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth). 
27  A five-year THV (visa subclass 451) was also created for persons reserved for resettlement 
by the UNHCR in Indonesia, and such visa holders were able to apply for a PPV after four 
and a half years: Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 108; Vrachnas et al, Migration and 
Refugee Law (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 331. 
28  Vrachnas et al, above n 27, 185. 
29  Mary Crock and Daniel Ghezelbash, ‘Do Loose Lips Bring Ships? The Role of Policy, 
Politics and Human Rights in Managing Unauthorised Boat Arrivals’ (2010) 19(2) Griffith 
Law Review 238, 267. 
30  Janet Phillips, A Comparison of Coalition and Labor Government Asylum Policies in 
Australia Since 2001 (Research Paper, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2014) 
4.   
31  Apart from some minor policy changes which are detailed in Mansouri and Leach, above n 
9, 108–19. 
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system 32  and dismantling the ‘cynical, costly and ultimately 
unsuccessful’33 Pacific Solution. Offshore processing ceased,34 TPVs and 
THVs were abolished and replaced with PPVs,35 and the seven day rule 
was repealed.36 This was largely in response to a lack of evidence 
demonstrating any deterrent effect, and human rights concerns.37  
B  Second TPV Regime 
The Rudd and Gillard Governments tried alternative policies, but these 
were abandoned after successful legal challenges in the High Court.38 
Facing ever-increasing levels of boat arrivals, the Gillard Government 
commissioned the Houston Report, which advocated a ‘no advantage’ 
principle for irregular maritime migrants.39 Labor subsequently retreated 
from its humanitarian principles and reinstated offshore processing.40 
Offshore entry persons were subject to the statutory bar on lodging valid 
visa applications and could be removed to regional processing facilities in 
the Pacific (first in Nauru, and then in Papua New Guinea).41 In May 
2013, the entire Australian mainland was excised from the migration zone 
(with respect to irregular maritime migrants).42 The effect of this was to 
extend the statutory bar to all arrivals at an Australian territory or the 
Australian mainland, such that all ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ 
(‘UMAs’) 43 were ineligible for any type of visa in the absence of an 
exercise of ministerial discretion. In June 2013, it was announced that all 
UMAs would be sent offshore for processing and resettlement and those 
found to be refugees would not be resettled in Australia (the ‘Regional 
Transfer and Resettlement’). An agreement concerning such offshore 
                                                
32  Peter Billings, ‘Irregular Maritime Migration and the Pacific Solution Mark II: Back to the 
Future for Refugee Law and Policy in Australia?’ (2013) 20 International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights 279, 279. 
33  In the words of then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship Chris Evans: see ‘Flight From 
Nauru Ends Pacific Solution’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 8 February 2008 < 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/flight-from-nauru-ends-pacific-solution-20080207-
1qww.html>.  
34  Future unauthorised boat arrivals were processed on Christmas Island pursuant to s 46A of 
the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 
35  Migration Amendment Regulations 2008 (No 5) (Cth). 
36  Ibid. 
37  Concerns regarding, for example, the health of refugees, their ability to work and their 
ability to sponsor family members for resettlement. These are further discussed in Part III. 
See also Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 119. 
38  See, eg, Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319; Plaintiff M70/2011 v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144. 
39  A Houston, Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers (Australian Government, August 
2012). 
40  Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 
(Cth). 
41  Phillips, above n 30, 5.   
42  Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 
(Cth). It should be noted that the Howard Government tried unsuccessfully to do this in 
2006 with the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). 
43  Now defined in s 5AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 
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processing and resettlement was first brokered with Papua New Guinea in 
July 2013,44 and later with Nauru in August 2013.45  
After the federal election of September 2013, offshore processing 
remained in place and was augmented by Operation Sovereign Borders.46 
On 17 October 2013, the Abbott Government attempted to reintroduce 
TPVs by regulation,47 but this was disallowed by the Senate on 2 
December 2013.48 There was another attempt on 12 December 2013,49 
which was disallowed on 27 March 2014. Other regulatory devices, such 
as visa capping, were also attempted. This scheme gave the Minister the 
power to ‘cap’ or limit the number of visas in a particular subclass that 
could be granted each year. Once the cap was reached, no further visas 
could be granted, and applicants waited in a queue to be considered in the 
next year. Visa capping was ruled unlawful by the High Court at the 
time.50 In December 2014, however, substantial amendments to the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the ‘Act’) were passed.51 In addition to 
removing most references to the Refugee Convention from the Act and 
codifying a narrow interpretation of Australia’s protection obligations,52 
                                                
44  Kevin Rudd, ‘Australia and Papua New Guinea Regional Settlement Arrangement’ (Media 
Release, 19 July 2013) <http://egypt.embassy.gov.au/files/caro/nn.pdf>; Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, Regional Resettlement Arrangement (July 2013) 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/2611766/upload_binary/26117
66.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22media/pressrel/2611766%22>. 
45  Kevin Rudd, ‘New Arrangement with Nauru Government’ (Media Release, 3 August 2013) 
< 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2F
pressrel%2F2643063%22>. 
46  Operation Sovereign Borders is a border protection operation aimed at preventing the arrival 
of unauthorised maritime arrivals. It is led by the Australian Defence Force, and was 
implemented by the Abbott Government in accordance with its election policy. 
47  Migration Amendment (Temporary Protection Visas) Regulation 2013 (Cth). 
48  Australian Human Rights Commission, Temporary Protection Visas (December 2013) 
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/TPV_FactSheet.p
df>. In the time the regulation was in force, at least 3 TPVs were granted to UMAs 
recognised as refugees, which remain valid despite the disallowance: Evidence to the Senate 
Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 
19 November 2013 (Senator Boyce) [9]; (Senator Cash) [33]. 
49  Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrival) Regulation 2013 (Cth). 
50  Plaintiff M150 of 2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 309 ALR 
225. Greater power and discretion was given to the Government by the Migration and 
Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 
2014 (Cth), considered below. 
51  Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy 
Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth). 
52  It is perhaps telling that sch 5 of the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation 
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth), which made these 
changes, is titled ‘Clarifying Australia’s International Law Obligations’. It is also notable 
that Australia did not withdraw from the Refugee Convention or any IHRL instruments. 
Freckelton has noted that the purpose of these amendments may be ‘to ‘freeze’ the law at the 
date the Act comes into effect, and prevent courts from applying any future overseas 
developments in Australia’: Alan Freckelton, Administrative Decision-Making in Australian 
Migration Law (ANU Press, 2015) 110. These developments raise many concerns regarding 
Australia’s compliance with its international law obligations, which fall beyond the scope of 
this article. 
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the amendments legislatively reinstated TPVs (visa subclass 785) and 
introduced Safe Haven Enterprise Visas (‘SHEVs’) (visa subclass 790). 
TPVs were said to be ‘a key element of the Government’s border 
protection strategy to combat people smuggling and to discourage people 
from making dangerous voyages to Australia’.53  
Recipients of TPVs under the new regime fall into three categories: 
First, there are specific groups of UMAs. Those UMAs that arrived 
before 13 August 2012 (the date of the Houston Report) generally had the 
statutory bar lifted,54 and were able to lodge a valid PPV application.55 
These applications are now deemed to be nullities and are automatically 
converted into TPV applications.56 Those UMAs that arrived after 19 July 
2013 are subject to the Regional Transfer and Resettlement policy, and 
are liable to be removed, processed and potentially resettled offshore. 
This cohort continues to be ineligible for any Australian visa.57 The 
critical group is composed of those UMAs that arrived between 13 
August 2012 and December 2013, who were not transferred offshore (the 
‘legacy caseload’) due to capacity issues in the offshore processing 
centres on Nauru and Manus Island.58 The Minister began ‘lifting the bar’ 
for these people in May 2015, enabling the legacy caseload cohort to 
lodge visa applications.59 Significantly, they are assessed under the new 
‘fast-track assessment process’ with limited review rights.60 If successful, 
they are granted TPVs or SHEVs. 
                                                
53  Explanatory Memorandum, Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment 
(Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014 (Cth)  s 6. 
54  The bar on valid visa applications was imposed by Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 46A. 
55  Refugee Advice & Casework Service, Chronology of Recent Changes Affecting Asylum 
Seekers <http://www.racs.org.au/wp-content/uploads/RACS-FACT-SHEET-Chronology-of-
legal-changes-affecting-asylum-seekers-26-May-2014.pdf>. 
56  This is done by operation of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 45AA. Although inapplicable 
on the facts, the conversion rule was considered by the High Court in Plaintiff S297-2013 v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 CLR 231. 
57  Above n 44; This is subject to one caveat: the Government has indicated that some asylum 
seekers currently in detention in Australia pending their transfer to Nauru may instead be 
assessed in Australia and be eligible for TPVs or SHEVs: Refugee Advice & Casework 
Service, Radical New Refugee Laws Have Now Been Passed by Parliament, 2 
<http://www.racs.org.au/wp-content/uploads/RACS-FACT-SHEET-The-Asylum-Legacy-
Caseload-Act-18-February-2015.pdf>. 
58  Many were released from detention into the community on bridging visas without work 
rights (BVEs) while they waited for an outcome on their asylum claims. 
59  Refugee Advice & Casework Service, Refugee Law Timeline: Legal Changes and Changes 
to Processing Procedures Affecting Asylum Seekers Arriving by Boat (13 October 2015) 
<http://www.racs.org.au/wp-content/uploads/RACS-FACT-SHEET-Chronology-of-legal-
changes-affecting-boat-arrivals-13.10.20151.pdf>. 
60  The Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum 
Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth) introduced a ‘fast-track assessment process’. If the 
primary assessment of a ‘fast-track applicant’ is negative, there is no right of review to the 
Refugee Review Tribunal (‘RRT’), only to the newly established Immigration Assessment 
Authority (‘IAA’). The IAA is a statutory body providing more limited merits review (no 
hearings and no new information) than the RRT, with the objective of being quick, efficient 
and free of bias. 
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Second, there are those asylum seekers who do not hold a visa or have 
not cleared immigration on arrival into Australia (such as unauthorised air 
arrivals). If recognised as refugees, these asylum seekers can only be 
granted TPVs.  
Third, there are asylum seekers who have previously held certain 
types of temporary visas listed in the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) 
(the ‘Regulations’).61 This provides the mechanism whereby TPVs can be 
renewed after expiry, and refugees on other temporary visas can be 
transferred to TPVs.  
These three classes of refugees are ineligible for the grant of a PPV, as 
the criteria require that a PPV applicant:62 
does not hold, and has not ever held, certain listed types of temporary visas; 
held a visa that was in effect on the person's last entry into Australia; 
is not an unauthorised maritime arrival; and 
was immigration cleared on the person's last entry into Australia. 
As before, TPV-holders ‘face the prospect of having their immigration 
status periodically reviewed and hence have hanging over them the 
permanent threat of possible repatriation’.63 For completeness it should be 
noted that SHEVs theoretically provide a pathway to permanent 
protection.64 If a SHEV holder does not receive any social security 
benefits for a period totalling 42 months, and/or is engaged in 
employment or full time study in a specified regional area, they may be 
eligible to apply for a range of general migration visas.65 However, 
former Minister for Immigration Scott Morrison indicated that the 
‘benchmarks of working or studying in … regional areas are very high’ 
and that this is a ‘very limited opportunity’ with a ‘very high bar’.66  
 
 
 
                                                
61  Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 1 subclause 1403(3)(d). 
62  Ibid subclause 1401(3)(d). 
63  Taylor, above n 7, 1. 
64  Refugee Advice & Casework Service, above n 57; Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for 
International Refugee Law, Factsheet: Temporary Protection Visas, University of New 
South 
Wales <http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/Temporary%20Protection%
20Visas%20rev%2025.07.12014.pdf>. 
65  Refugee Advice & Casework Service, above n 57; University of New South Wales, above n 
64. 
66  Scott Morrison, ‘Press Conference at Parliament House 25 September 2014’ (Press 
Conference, 25 September 
2014) <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22me
dia%2Fpressrel%2F3414551%22>; University of New South Wales, above n 64. 
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C  Rights and Obligations Under a TPV 
1  First TPV Regime 
Under the Howard Government’s TPV regime, TPVs granted three years 
of residence,67 and the right to return was lost if the refugee left the 
country.68 TPV-holders were usually able to apply for PPVs after 30 
months, subject to the changes effected by the 2001 amendments. There 
was no right to family reunification, but TPV-holders were granted the 
right to work, and access to job matching by Centrelink.69 Subject to the 
policy of individual States, they had access to school education, but the 
imposition of full fees effectively excluded them from universities.70 
TPV-holders were only eligible for some of the federally funded 
special settlement services designed to assist new arrivals in Australia.71 
These included the Special Benefit, Rent Assistance, the Family Tax 
Benefit, the Child Care Benefit, Medicare, the Early Health Assessment 
and Intervention Program, torture and trauma counselling, and English as 
a Second Language classes (for TPV minors only).72 They were denied 
access to most federally funded English language classes (including the 
Adult Migrant English Program and the Advanced English for Migrants 
Program), 73  housing assistance, Migrant Resource Centre support 
schemes, and other programs offered under the Integrated Humanitarian 
Settlement Scheme.74 Furthermore, they were not eligible for Newstart, 
Sickness Allowance, the Parenting Payment, Youth Allowance, Austudy 
or a range of other benefits.75  
2  Second TPV Regime 
Under the current regime, a TPV entitles the holder to stay in 
Australia for three years, or a lesser period specified by the Minister.76 A 
TPV-holder is not entitled to be granted a substantive visa or a PPV.77 
They may only travel outside of Australia where the Minister is satisfied 
that there are ‘compassionate or compelling circumstances’ justifying the 
                                                
67  Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 104. 
68  Ibid 104–6. 
69  Refugee Council of Australia, Position Paper on Australia’s use of Temporary Protection 
Visas for Convention Refugees, the Council, September 2003; Phillips, above n 22, 1; 
Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 104–6. 
70  Refugee Council of Australia, above n 69. 
71  Phillips, above n 22, 1. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Refugee Council of Australia, above n 69. 
74  Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 106; Phillips, above n 22, 1. 
75  Refugee Council of Australia, above n 69. 
76  Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2 cl 785.511. Pursuant to that clause, if the TPV-
holder makes an application for a subsequent TPV or SHEV, the first TPV remains on foot 
throughout the application process. 
77  Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 8 condition 8503, imposed by sch 2 cl 785.611. 
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travel,78 and, if a TPV-holder travels to the country where they fear 
persecution, their visa will be cancelled.79 TPV-holders otherwise enjoy 
freedom of movement within Australia, but must notify the Department 
of Immigration of any change of address within 28 days.80 
There is no right to family reunification, but TPV-holders are granted 
the right to work, access to employment support services, and job 
matching by Centrelink.81 TPV-holders have the same access to primary 
and secondary education as permanent residents, but are limited in 
tertiary education due to their ineligibility for Federal Government higher 
education loans and Commonwealth-supported places.82 They also have 
access to social security benefits (Centrelink), and short-term counselling 
for torture or trauma.83 They are eligible for Medicare, the Special 
Benefit, the Family Tax Benefit and a range of ancillary income support 
payments, subject to relevant eligibility requirements.84 While they are 
given access to the Skills for Education and Employment program, they 
do not have access to the Adult Migrant English Program or settlement 
services.85 Against this background, the first challenge to the current 
regime may be considered. 
III  Consistency with Human Rights Norms 
A  Introduction 
The task of ensuring that Australian domestic law is compliant with all of 
its international law protection obligations to refugees falls to the 
Commonwealth Parliament.86 It must ensure that domestic legislation 
implements in good faith all of Australia’s international law obligations.87 
Accordingly, it is particularly important that developments in domestic 
                                                
78  Ibid, sch 8 condition 8570, imposed by sch 2 cl 785.611. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Ibid, sch 8 condition 8565, imposed by sch 2 cl 785.611. 
81  Refugee Council of Australia, Migration and Maritime Power Legislation Amendment 
(Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014: What it means for Asylum 
Seekers <http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/1502-Legacy-
Caseload.pdf>; Refugee Advice & Casework Service, above n 57; University of New South 
Wales, above n 64. 
82  Refugee Council of Australia, above n 81. 
83  Refugee Advice & Casework Service, above n 57. 
84  Refugee Council of Australia, above n 81. 
85  Ibid. 
86  It is the competent legislature: Australian Constitution ss 51(xix), (xxvii). It is doubtful that 
the judiciary alone can accomplish the task; see the analysis of its limited interpretive tools 
in John Azzi, ‘Domestic Legislation and Australia’s International Obligations’ (2015) 131 
Law Quarterly Review 524. 
87  On this note see art 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for 
signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) (‘Vienna 
Convention’). 
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law occur by reference to a clear understanding of Australia’s 
international obligations.88  
The Refugee Convention ‘operates within the framework of 
international human rights law’.89 Two fundamental ideas are often 
overlooked in discussions regarding refugees in Australia. First, the 
Refugee Convention is primarily a human rights instrument,90 and must 
be interpreted as such.91 Second, it operates not in isolation, but as part of 
a larger governing framework of IHRL, which is also a primary source of 
rights for refugees.92 It has been said that ‘keeping international refugee 
law distinct from [IHRL] has played into the hands of governments 
choosing to flout minimum standards’.93 Contracting States are obliged to 
grant refugees the rights guaranteed under both the Refugee Convention 
and IHRL.94 
This Part examines the compliance of the TPV regime with two 
human rights norms that are not explicitly protected by the Refugee 
Convention: the right to health, and the right to protection of the family.95 
B  Right to Health 
The Refugee Convention 96 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 97 do not expressly safeguard the right to health.98 Article 
                                                
88  Although it is clear that there can be significant disagreements among and between 
academics and the judiciary on what those obligations are: see Plaintiff M47-2012 v 
Director General of Security (2012) 251 CLR 1, 117–8 (Heydon J). 
89  James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 154; see also Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 1, 285; Rafiqul 
Islam and Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, An Introduction to International Refugee Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) 78. The benefit of rights outside the Refugee Convention is 
provided by article 5: Tom Clark, ‘Mainstreaming Refugee Rights - The 1951 Refugee 
Convention and International Human Rights Law’ (1999) 17(4) Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 389, 400. 
90  Mary Crock, ‘Shadow Plays: Shifting Sands and International Refugee Law: Convergences 
in the Asia-Pacific’ (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 247, 253; Susan 
Kneebone, ‘The Pacific Plan: The Provision of ‘Effective Protection?’ (2006) International 
Journal of Refugee Law 696, 705. 
91  R v Asfaw [2008] AC 1061, 1079-80 [11]; see also UNHCR, Conclusions Adopted By The 
Executive Committee on The International Protection of Refugees, 1975 – 2008 (Conclusion 
No. 1 – 109), No. 82 (XLVIII) (1997): Safeguarding Asylum, para. (d)(vi); No. 19 (XXXI) 
(1980): Temporary Refuge, para. (e); No. 22 (XXXII) (1981): Protection of Asylum-Seekers 
in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, para. B; No. 36 (XXXVI) (1985): General Conclusion 
on International Protection, para. (f). 
92  Hathaway, above n 89, 154; Castillo and Hathaway, above n 14, 7. 
93  Alice Edwards, ‘Human Rights, Refugees and The Right ‘To Enjoy’ Asylum’ (2005) 17(2) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 293, 294.    
94  These points were aptly made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh v Canada [2002] 1 
SCR 3, 44 [72]. 
95  For other potential breaches of human rights norms, further reading that may be consulted 
includes: Marston, ‘A Punitive Policy’, above n 7; Louise Humpage and Greg Marston, The 
Situated Politics of Belonging (SAGE, 2006). 
96  The Refugee Convention only contains a provision dealing with health care services in art 
24. 
97  Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 
1976) (‘ICCPR’).   
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7 of the ICCPR does prohibit ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,’ 
and TPVs have been unfavourably assessed in this context elsewhere.99 
This section instead focuses on the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,100 which expressly safeguards the right to 
health in art 12(1):101 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health. 
This obliges Australia to ‘take steps … to the maximum of [its] 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of [this right]’.102 On the assumption that Australia has 
sufficient resources,103 it may not lawfully refrain from taking the 
necessary steps to fully implement the right to health.104  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘CESCR’) 
has noted that the right to health contains both freedoms and 
entitlements.105 In his report on the right to health, Special Rapporteur 
Paul Hunt noted the entitlement to ‘a system of health protection, 
including health care and the underlying determinants of health, which 
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable 
standard of health.’106 Among other things, 107 the right to health requires 
States to ‘refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the 
enjoyment of the right to health’.108 The obligation applies in respect of 
‘asylum seekers and illegal immigrants’.109 
The social conditions imposed by TPVs have adverse impacts on the 
mental health of TPV-holders,110 and it is contended that this constitutes a 
                                                                                                       
98  Although the ICCPR does contain some direct (arts 7–8) and indirect (arts 2–3, 6, 9, 12, 17–
9, 21–4) links. 
99  Taylor has argued that the TPV regime is flawed because it is not designed to ensure that the 
ensuing psychosocial harm (further discussed below) will never reach the threshold of 
‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’: Taylor, above n 7, 8. 
100  Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) 
(‘ICESCR’). 
101  Article 12(2) lists certain steps to be taken by States to achieve full realisation of this right. 
102  ICESCR art 2(1). 
103  Any challenge to this assumption is outside the scope of this article. 
104  Hathaway, above n 89, 512. 
105  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 22nd sess, UN Doc E/C12/2000/4 (2000) [8]. 
106  Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
E/CN.4/2005/51 (2005) [42]; see also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
General Comment 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 22nd sess, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [8]. 
107  It also imposes obligations to protect and fulfil: Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health, 
22nd sess, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [33]. 
108  Ibid. 
109  Ibid [34]. 
110  That is not to suggest that the physical health of refugees may not also be affected. One 
particular issue which arises with refugees is the increasing levels of family violence. This is 
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breach of Australia’s obligations under art 12. The existing literature 
(detailed below) demonstrates that TPVs under the first regime negatively 
affected the mental health of refugees. While the studies discussed were 
conducted in the context of the first TPV regime, the findings nonetheless 
remain relevant to the second regime. 
For instance, one study found that temporary protection impacted 
dramatically on the mental health of the visa-holders, and that the 
temporary status was the greatest single contributor to post-traumatic 
stress disorder (‘PTSD’).111 Another study indicated that TPV-holders had 
a 700% increased risk of developing depression and PTSD when 
compared with PPV-holders; it was said that these extended periods of 
temporary protection operated to ‘lock individuals into an unresolvable 
future-oriented’ stress, undermining standard treatments and therapies for 
trauma.112  
A mixed-methods study showed that 46% of temporary visa holders, 
compared with 25% of permanent visa holders, reported symptoms 
consistent with a diagnosis of clinical depression.113 Research has also 
shown that TPV-holders have a higher level of trauma exposure, twice the 
risk of PTSD of permanent residents, and significantly heightened levels 
of anticipatory stress.114 Restrictions on access to settlement services 
combined with uncertainty about the future have also been found to 
impact negatively on the integration of TPV-holders into the 
community.115 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to canvas all of the existing 
research to demonstrate the point,116 there appears to be a general 
consensus among health practitioners that the social conditions imposed 
by TPVs tend to impact negatively on the mental health of refugees. This 
                                                                                                       
likely to be more prevalent with PPV-holders than TPV-holders, as the former are permitted 
to make family visa sponsorship applications. Any consideration of this issue would need to 
take account of recent changes to the obligations of such sponsors.  
111  See generally Shakeh Momartin et al, ‘A Comparison of the Mental Health of Refugees with 
Temporary Versus Permanent Protection Visas’ (2006) 185(7) Medical Journal of Australia 
357. 
112  Derrick Silove and Zachary Steel, ‘Temporary Protection Visas Compromise Refugees: 
New Research’ (University of New South Wales Media Release, 30 January 2004). 
113  See generally Vanessa Johnston et al, ‘Measuring the Health Impact of Human Rights 
Violations Related to Australian Asylum Policies and Practices: a Mixed Methods Study’ 
(2009) 9 BMC International Health and Human Rights 1. 
114  Zachary Steele, ‘The Politics of Exclusion and Denial: The Mental Health Costs of 
Australia’s Refugee Policy’ (Paper presented at 38th Congress of the Royal Australian and 
New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, Hobart, 12–15 May 2003) 16–7. 
115  Marston, Temporary Protection, above n 7. 
116  For further reading, see generally: Mansouri and Leach, above n 7; D Barnes, ‘A Life 
Devoid of Meaning: Living on a Temporary Protection Visa In Western Sydney’ (Research 
Paper, Centre for Refugee Research, University of New South Wales, December 2002); 
Sharon Pickering et al, ‘‘We’re Working with People Here’: The Impact of the TPV Regime 
on Refugee Settlement Service Provision in NSW’ (Research Paper, Charles Sturt 
University, date omitted); Fethi Mansouri and Stephanie Cauchi, ‘The Psychological Impact 
of Extended Temporary Protection’ (2006) 23(3) Refuge 81; Stuart Murray and Susan Skull, 
‘Immigrant and Refugee Health’ (2002) 2(3) Environmental Health 47. 
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is attributable, in large part, to the perpetual state of uncertainty that 
follows from having to re-establish a refugee claim every 3 years.117 
However, the uncertainty produced by TPVs is not the sole cause of 
health issues.118 Other factors include the traumatic experience of 
mandatory detention,119 time spent in the community on bridging visas 
without work rights (‘BVEs’),120 the refugee status determination process, 
lack of family reunification,121 and fear of returning home.122  
Australia’s TPV policy may, therefore, constitute a breach of its 
obligation under article 12 to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment 
of the right to health. Although most article 12 jurisprudence deals with a 
failure to take positive steps to provide an adequate system of health 
protection and care, Australia’s policy goes one step further and actively 
prevents the attainment of the highest standard of physical and mental 
health. While the Government has claimed that the right to health is 
implemented through Medicare and the Australian public health system, 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights has noted that this 
fails to address the negative mental health effects of TPVs.123 
                                                
117  On the legality under international law of the refugee having to re-establish their claim, see 
generally: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 
2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘UNHCR 
Concerned About Confirmation of TPV System by High Court’ (Press Release, 20 
November 2006); Hossein Esmaeeili and Suzanne Carlton, ‘Safe to go Home? The 
Implications of the High Court Decision for Afghan and Iraqi Temporary Refugees, MIMA 
v QAAH of 2004’ (2007) 32(3) Alternative Law Journal 66; Emily Hay and Susan 
Kneebone, ‘Refugee Status in Australia and the Cessation Provisions: QAAH of 2004 v 
MIMIA’ (2006) 31(3) Alternative Law Journal 147; Maria O’Sullivan, ‘Before the High 
Court: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH: 
Cessation of Refugee Status’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 359; Maria O’Sullivan, 
‘Withdrawing Protection Under Article 1C(5) of the 1951 Convention: Lessons from 
Australia’ (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 586.  
118  This is so even though at least one study has shown that temporary protection contributes, 
independently of detention, to the risk of ongoing PTSD, depression and mental health-
related disability: Zachary Steel et al, ‘Impact of Immigration Detention and Temporary 
Protection on the Mental Health of Refugees’ (2006) 188 British Journal of Psychiatry 58. 
Further, in the context of Bosnian refugees resettled in Australia see also Shakeh Momartin 
et al, ‘Dimensions of Trauma Associated with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Caseness, Severity and Functional Impairment: A Study of Bosnian Refugees Resettled in 
Australia’ (2003) 57 Social Science & Medicine 775. 
119  Tom Mann, Desert Sorrow (Wakefield Press, 2004). 
120  Derrick Silove, ‘Mental Health of Asylum Seekers: Australia in a Global Context’ in P 
Allotey (ed), The Health of Refugees: Public Health Perspectives from Crisis to Settlement 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 68, 76. 
121  McMaster, above n 7, 16–7; K Dixon-Fyle, ‘Reunification: Putting the Family First’ (1994) 
95 Refugees 6, 9; Stuart Turner, ‘Torture, Refuge and Trust’ in E V Daniel and J C Knudsen 
(eds), Mistrusting Refugees (University of California Press, 1995) 56, 62, 67; Derrick 
Silove, ‘The Psychological Effects of Torture, Mass Human Rights Violations and Refugee 
Trauma: Toward an Integrated Conceptual Framework’ (1999) 187 Journal of Nervous and 
Mental Disease 200, 202; Marston, Temporary Protection, above n 7, 25–8; Ida Kaplan and 
Kim Webster, ‘Refugee Women and Settlement: Gender and Mental Health’ in P Allotey 
(ed), The Health of Refugees: Public Health Perspectives from Crisis to Settlement (Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 104, 109. 
122  Fethi Mansouri, Michael Leach and Amy Nethery, ‘Temporary Protection and the Refugee 
Convention in Australia, Denmark, and Germany’ (2009) 26(1) Refuge 135, 145. 
123  In the Statement of Compatibility accompanying the bill. 
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The only possible escape from the preceding conclusion lies in art 4 
ICESCR, which allows States to impose limitations ‘as determined by 
law’ on rights ‘solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in 
a democratic society’. It is doubtful that the purpose of deterring irregular 
migration meets this high threshold. Even if it is assumed that it does, the 
inherent proportionality requirement is unlikely to be satisfied given the 
negative effects on refugee mental health.124 Furthermore, the second 
TPV regime appears to be more restrictive than the first because it 
removes any practical possibility of attaining permanent protection. It 
may be that the first TPV regime reflected the Howard Government’s 
judgment that three years on a TPV was about as much adversity as it 
could inflict without breaching ICESCR art 12.125 Under the second TPV 
regime, however, there is potentially no end to the ‘existential 
moratorium’126 imposed on refugees, and the resultant mental health 
effects are likely to be aggravated accordingly. 
C  Protection of the Family 
In fleeing from persecution, refugees run the very real risk of separation 
from their families.127 While the Refugee Convention itself does not grant 
any rights relating to protection of a refugee’s family,128 the ICCPR and 
ICESCR do grant such a right.129 The analysis in this section focuses on 
the ICCPR, which contains two relevant provisions. Article 17(1) 130 
provides that: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his … 
family … 
                                                
124  For an analysis of the inherent proportionality requirement, see Amrei Muller, ‘Limitations 
to and Derogations from Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 9(4) Human Rights 
Law Review 557, 560. 
125  A similar argument was made by Taylor in respect of ICCPR art 7: Taylor, above n 7, 10. 
126  Mansouri, Leach and Nethery, above n 122, 141. 
127  K Jastram and K Newland, ‘Family Unity and Refugee Protection’ in E Feller, V Turk and F 
Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations 
on International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 555, 555. 
128  It instead focuses on the rights and protection of the individual. See, eg, Re Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S134/2002 
(2003) 195 ALR 1; Hathaway, above n 89, 254. At 541, Hathaway points out that the 
drafters of the Refugee Convention assumed that the family members of a refugee would 
benefit from its protection even if they did not qualify as refugees. The argument that family 
reunification is emerging as a norm of customary international law in the refugee context 
has been covered elsewhere: See, eg, Edwards, above n 93, 309–10. 
129  See arts 23 and 17 of the ICCPR and art 10 of the ICESCR. Special considerations also arise 
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 
1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) (‘CRC’), but these are outside the 
scope of this article due to space constraints. 
130  Article 17(2) provides a right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks. 
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Article 23(1) 131 provides that: 
The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the State. 
Both arts apply to non-citizens.132 Article 17 requires that any 
interference with the family be carried out on the basis of legal authority, 
‘which must itself comply with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant’.133 Even if lawful, the interference must not be arbitrary. The 
Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) is of the opinion that lawful 
interference is only non-arbitrary if it is ‘in accordance with the 
provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant’134 and Nowak has said 
that ‘arbitrary interference contains elements of injustice, unpredictability, 
and unreasonableness’.135 
Article 23 entails a positive duty to protect the family,136 by adopting 
‘legislative, administrative or other measures.’137 Although the article is 
‘economically relative’, in that the level of entitlement will vary with the 
economic circumstances of the State,138 it is assumed for the purposes of 
this article that Australia will not be able to rely on this feature to justify 
any failure to implement the right. The HRC has adopted a broad 
definition of family, such that it must include all those comprising the 
family as understood in the society of the State.139 
In the refugee context, the right to protection of the family manifests 
itself in the form of the right to family reunification,140 which is the 
ability to sponsor family members for resettlement in Australia. Article 
23 should be read as compelling States to take measures to ‘ensure the 
unity or reunification of refugee families in the state of asylum’ to be 
assessed at the standard of reasonableness.141 The HRC has taken a broad 
                                                
131  Articles 23(2)–(4) deal with various aspects of marriage. While there is a right to family 
reunification in art 23(2), is it subsumed within article 23(1), and for this reason is not 
expressly considered here.  
132  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15: The Position of Aliens Under the 
Covenant, 27th sess, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 at 140 (2004) [5], [7]. 
133  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), 32th sess, 
UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 at 142 (2004) [3]. 
134  Ibid [4]. 
135  Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl 
am Rhein: N.P. Engel Publishing, 2005 rev ed) 291. 
136  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 19: Article 23 (The Family), 39th sess, UN 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 149 (2003) [1]. 
137  Ibid [3]. 
138  Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 35/1978, 12th sess, UN Doc. Supp. 
No. 40 (A/36/40) at 134 (1981) (‘Aumeeruddy-Cziffra et al v Mauritius’) [9.2]. 
139  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 16, 35th sess, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 
142 (2003) [5]; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 19: Article 23 (The Family), 
39th sess, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 149 (2003) [2]. 
140  In similar vein, Edwards considers that ‘family unity is a subset or characteristic of having a 
family life’ and that family reunification may be the only way of giving effect to the right to 
protection of the family: Edwards, above n 93, 311, 314; see also Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment 19: Article 23 (The Family), 39th sess, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 149 
(2003) [5]. 
141  Hathaway, above n 89, 552, 557. 
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approach to applying the right to family reunification, using it as the basis 
for making adverse comments against a Swiss law (that only allowed 
foreign workers family reunification after 18 months),142 a Zimbabwean 
law (that denied automatic residential rights to all foreign spouses),143 and 
an Austrian law (that allowed family reunification only for nuclear family 
members).144 
While there is no right to enter and reside in another country for the 
purposes of family reunification,145 Australia is arguably in breach of its 
international protection obligations by failing to afford TPV-holders the 
right to sponsor family members for resettlement. Without adequate 
justification, Australia’s blanket prohibition on family reunification for 
TPV-holders does not implement the right in a reasonable way, and falls 
foul of arts 17 and 23. Australia’s justification for denying family 
reunification when a family sends out one member in search of asylum is 
as follows: 
[A UMA] becomes separated from their family when they choose to travel to 
Australia without their family. To this end, Australia does not consider that 
Articles 17 and 23 were engaged. Even if … engaged, the change … simply 
places [UMAs] on an equal footing with all other Australian citizens and 
permanent residents wanting their family to join them in Australia. Australia 
considers that this is a necessary, reasonable and proportionate measure to 
achieve the legitimate aim of preventing [UMAs] from making the dangerous 
journey to Australia by boat. To the extent that this might amount to 
interference with the family, Australia maintains that any interference is not 
arbitrary.146 
This rationale for restricting family reunion is unpersuasive for several 
reasons: 
First, the claim that refugees choose to leave their families does not 
reflect the realities of forced migration and the prohibitive costs of using 
people smugglers. The assertion that the prohibition on family 
reunification does not, of itself, cause separation of families fails to 
acknowledge that genuine refugees cannot be expected to return to their 
countries of origin.147 While the statement is true when taken at face 
value, Australia’s practice is nonetheless at odds with its obligations 
                                                
142  Human Rights Committee, Concluding Comment on Switzerland, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.70 (1996) [18]. 
143  Human Rights Committee, Concluding Comments on Zimbabwe, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.89 (1998) [19]. 
144  Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Austria, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/AUT/CO/4 (2007) [19]. 
145  Edwards, above n 93, 309. 
146  Explanatory Statement to Migration Amendment Regulation 2012 (No 5), Select Legislative 
Instrument 2012 No 230 issued by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship under the 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth). 
147  This was noted by the HRC in Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 
1143/2002, 90th sess, UN Doc. CCPR/C/89/D/1043/2002 (2007) (‘El Dernawi v Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya’) [6.3]. 
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under the ICCPR to take positive steps to ‘ensure the unity or 
reunification of [refugee] families’.148 
Second, the statement that the laws places UMAs on ‘equal footing’ 
with other citizens and permanent residents again fundamentally 
misconceives the situation in which a refugee finds himself or herself. 
While citizens and permanent residents may have the option of achieving 
family reunification by travelling overseas, this is often not a path open to 
refugees on protection visas. The travel restrictions on a TPV were 
outlined in Part II. The unique situation of refugees requires Australia to 
take unique measures to safeguard their rights. 
Third, the stated aim of deterring UMAs does not rationally support 
and sustain the second regime. This is further considered in Part V. 
Fourth, even if the prohibition on family reunion were not in breach of 
international obligations, it is not clear that such interference with the 
family can be said to be non-arbitrary, as Australia claims. In view of the 
‘legal right of refugees to seek protection without advance permission and 
the duty of states to protect all refugees under their … jurisdiction’149 
there is no rational reason why unauthorised asylum seekers recognised 
as refugees are any less deserving of permanent protection than ‘offshore’ 
refugees.150 
Australia may, therefore, be in breach of its obligation to facilitate 
family reunification under international law, as noted by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights.151 Another potential 
challenge to the legality of the TPV regime is that the distinction drawn 
between unauthorised and authorised asylum seekers may constitute 
unlawful discrimination.152 
IV  Unlawful Discrimination 
As noted in Part II, TPVs are used only for unauthorised asylum seekers 
who are recognised as refugees. This raises the possibility that Australia’s 
use of TPVs for only these classes of refugees, while others may access 
PPVs, constitutes unlawful discrimination under international law. 
                                                
148  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 19: Article 23 (The Family), 39th sess, UN 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 149 (2003) [5]. 
149  Hathaway, above n 89, 558. 
150  It might also be argued that unauthorized asylum seekers are no less deserving of permanent 
protection than refugees who apply for asylum after entering Australia on valid visas. 
151  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Examination of 
Legislation in Accordance with the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011: Bills 
Introduced 30 September – 2 October 2014 (2014) 83–5. 
152  One issue which arises with respect to family visa applications made by PPV-holders is that 
the Minister has issued Direction 62, which provides that such applications are to be 
afforded the lowest processing priority. This issue was to be considered in the High Court, 
where proceeding S61/2016 was listed for final hearing on 7 October 2016. That hearing 
date has now been vacated, as the Minister revoked Direction 62 on 13 September 2016 and 
replaced it with Direction 72. That Direction allows decision-makers to depart from the 
processing order in certain circumstances. This issue does not arise for TPV-holders, who 
are subject to a blanket ban on making such applications. 
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Mansouri and Leach, for example, note that ‘[illegal boat people were] 
targeted for discriminatory treatment in Australia.’153 Kneebone has 
argued that ‘[TPVs are] another instance of discrimination of this group 
of refugees in contrast to other aliens and nationals.’154 According to 
Crock ‘it is very difficult to see how Australia’s approach to UMAs does 
not amount to discrimination’.155  
There is a tendency to interpret the Refugee Convention ‘according to 
its own internal logic and objectives in isolation from [IHRL]’.156 As 
such, this Part first considers whether Australia’s TPV policy is 
unlawfully discriminatory under the Refugee Convention and then goes 
on to consider the same question under the ICCPR. 
A  Refugee Convention 
Article 3 of the Refugee Convention provides that: 
The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to 
refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin. 
As the meaning and substantive reach of art 3 is not clarified by its 
drafting history, guidance may be drawn from the parameters of non-
discrimination duties under cognate treaties.157 This is largely because 
treaties must be interpreted in their contemporary international legal 
context,158 and it is clear that the Refugee Convention is first and 
foremost a human rights instrument and must be interpreted as such.159  
Parallel non-discrimination provisions include arts 2 and 26 of the 
ICCPR and art 2 of the ICESCR. Drawing on the recommendation of 
Marx and Staff,160 it is submitted that the following (modified) HRC 
definition is apt: discrimination is ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference which is based on any [prohibited] ground, and which has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
                                                
153  Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 106. Although Mansouri and Leach appear to have come to 
this view by comparing unauthorised boat arrivals with refugees who arrived legally, they 
do go on to note the far greater number of air arrivals claiming asylum after arrival. 
154  Kneebone, above n 90, 719–20. 
155  Crock, above n 90, 272. Although Crock’s article was written before the reintroduction of 
TPVs, offshore processing had been reinstated at the time. 
156  Clark, above n 89, 389. 
157  Hathaway, above n 89, 244–5; Reinhard Marx and Wiebke Staff, ‘Article 3 (Non-
Discrimination)’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2011) 643, 
644–5. 
158  Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the 
Globalisation of Migration Control (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 82; Hathaway, 
above n 89, 64. 
159  R v Asfaw [2008] 1 AC 1061, 6–7 [11]; Crock, above n 90, 253; Kneebone, above n 90, 
705; Vrachnas et al, above n 27, 250. The point was also made by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Suresh v Canada [2002] 1 SCR 3, as noted above. 
160  Reinhard Marx and Wiebke Staff, ‘Article 3 (Non-Discrimination)’ in Andreas 
Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2011) 643, 652. 
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enjoyment or exercise by all [refugees], on an equal footing, of all rights 
and freedoms [guaranteed under the Refugee Convention]’.161 
Article 3 of the Refugee Convention is concerned with discrimination 
among and between refugees, and does not require that refugees receive 
the same treatment as nationals or other aliens.162 Such protection arises 
from other sources.163 Nonetheless, the challenge with which this section 
is concerned is that Australia’s use of TPVs for unauthorised arrivals 
constitutes discrimination between classes of refugees. 164  It may 
constitute positive discrimination because PPV-holders are granted 
greater rights than TPV-holders. This is encompassed by the above 
definition. 
Although the draft provision of art 3 contained a territorial limitation, 
this was later removed.165 Combined with the fact that not all provisions 
of the Refugee Convention are restricted to State Parties’ territories, this 
weighs in favour of a broad interpretation of discrimination, thereby 
extending the scope of application of art 3 to TPV-holders even if they are 
outside of Australian territory, as long as they are within Australia’s legal 
jurisdiction.  
Prima facie, Australia’s TPV policy does discriminate between classes 
of refugees. TPVs are only offered to unauthorised asylum seekers who 
are recognised as refugees. Asylum seekers who are authorised, on the 
other hand, are eligible for PPVs.166 It is doubtful, however, that this 
constitutes unlawful discrimination pursuant to art 3. Article 3 is not a 
general prohibition on discrimination; rather, it prohibits discrimination 
based on three enumerated grounds of race, religion or country of origin. 
The ‘mode of arrival’ discrimination evident in the offering of TPVs is 
not (at least, not directly) based on any of the relevant grounds. It might 
be argued that the effect of the policy is to discriminate against refugees 
of a particular race,167 religion or country of origin,168 given that most 
unauthorised arrivals are of Afghan, Iranian, Sri Lankan or South-East 
Asian origin. This argument is unlikely to succeed, however, as it is not 
                                                
161  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, 37th sess, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994). 
162  Hathaway, above n 89, 246–51; Marx and Staff, above n 157, 645. 
163  Protection against discrimination on the basis of refugee status is provided by art 7 of the 
Refugee Convention and non-discrimination provisions in other IHRL instruments. 
Furthermore, some articles of the Refugee Convention itself mandate parallel treatment of 
refugees and nationals or other aliens. Hathaway has noted that the Refugee Convention 
presumes the legitimacy of treating refugees less favourably than nationals to the extent that 
some articles grant rights defined by a contingent standard less than nationality (eg art 17). 
164  Discrimination against refugees, in general, as a class is outside the scope of this article. 
165  Marx and Staff, above n 157, 651. 
166  Although outside the scope of this article, it might also be argued that the policy 
discriminates between unauthorised asylum seekers and refugees who apply for asylum after 
entering Australia on valid visas. 
167  McMaster, above n 7, 2–3. 
168  J-P Fonteyne, ‘Illegal Refugees or Illegal Policy?’, in, William Maley, Alan Dupont, Jean-
Pierre Fonteyne et al., Refugees and the Myth of the Borderless World (Australian National 
University Department of International Relations, 2002) 16. 
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yet clear if the HRC has adopted an effects-based approach to the 
discrimination analysis.169 Hathaway has referred to the HRC as having 
only a ‘nascent preparedness to take seriously the discriminatory effects 
of facially neutral laws’.170 
Furthermore, the scope of art 3 is limited to the Refugee Convention 
itself. It is an accessory prohibition of discrimination and only becomes 
relevant if another provision of the Refugee Convention is affected.171 It 
is difficult to contend that the alleged discrimination relates to any 
specific provisions of the Refugee Convention. There is no explicit 
requirement that permanent protection be granted. TPV-holders enjoy 
freedom of movement within Australia,172 subject only to the caveat that 
they must notify the Department of Immigration of any change of address 
within 28 days.173 They have the same access to primary and secondary 
education as permanent residents.174 While they are limited in tertiary 
education due to their ineligibility for Federal Government higher 
education loans and Commonwealth-supported places, this is the case for 
all aliens.175 Furthermore, it is not clear that TPV-holders’ religious, 
property or association rights are impaired.176  
The two rights considered in Part III (above) are not found in the 
Refugee Convention. It might be argued, however, that art 34 
(naturalisation) is applied in a discriminatory fashion, given that TPV-
holders, unlike PPV-holders, are not usually able to attain permanent 
protection. Article 34 is breached ‘where a State party simply does not 
allow refugees to secure its citizenship, and refuses to provide a cogent 
explanation for that inaccessibility.’177 Although Australia has advanced a 
rationale of deterrence, it lacks coherence given that, among other things, 
the policy applies retrospectively. These deficiencies are further explored 
in Part V. At any rate, any argument is further weakened by the HRC’s 
practice of deferring to State perceptions of ‘reasonableness’ in 
determining whether certain action amounts to discrimination.178 
In summary, it is unlikely that Australia’s TPV regime constitutes 
unlawful discrimination under art 3 of the Refugee Convention, at least 
when viewed in isolation.  
                                                
169  Hathaway maintains that the HRC has yet to adopt such an approach, while certain 
communications of the HRC suggest otherwise: see Hathaway, above n 89, 133–9, 257; 
Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 998/2001, 78th sess, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001 (‘Althammer v Austria’). 
170  Hathaway, above n 89, 238. 
171  Ibid 252; Marx and Staff, above n 157, 647; Report of the Committee Appointed to Study 
Article 3, UN Doc. A/CONF.2/72, 11 July 1951, 3; R v Immigration Officer at Prague 
Airport; Ex parte European Roma Rights Central [2005] 2 AC 1, 45 [43] (Lord Steyn).  
172  For the right to freedom of movement see art 26. 
173  Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 8 condition 8565, imposed by sch 2 cl 785.611. 
174  For the right to education see art 22. 
175  Refugee Council of Australia, above n 81. 
176  Respectively, arts 22, 4, 13, and 15. 
177  Hathaway, above n 89, 252. 
178  Ibid 245, 251, 258. 
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B  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The two central non-discrimination provisions of the ICCPR are arts 2(1) 
and 26.179 Article 2(1) prohibits discrimination in respecting and ensuring 
the rights recognised in the ICCPR. Article 26, however, is an 
‘independent and autonomous right’180 extending beyond specific ICCPR 
rights181 and prohibiting discrimination ‘in law or in fact in any field 
regulated and protected by public authorities’.182 It provides that: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status (emphasis added). 
Article 26 is the focus of this section due to its broad scope, which 
obviates the need to establish a denial of ICCPR rights to refugees who 
are issued with TPVs.183 The argument here can simply proceed on the 
assumption that TPVs constitute less favourable treatment.184 While art 
26 might also be invoked in asserting that Australian law discriminates 
against refugees as a class, this possibility is outside the scope of this 
article.185  
The HRC defines discrimination as  
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status, which has the purpose 
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by 
all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms (emphasis 
added).186  
                                                
179  They reinforce the other more specific provisions in arts 3, 4(1), 20, 23, 24, and 25. 
180  Nowak, above n 135, 628. 
181  Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 172/1984, 29th sess, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/OP/2 at 196 (1990) (‘Broeks v The Netherlands’); this was confirmed in Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, 37th sess, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994) [12]. 
182  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, 37th sess, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994) [12]. 
183  Although, as Part III has sought to demonstrate, this may very well be the case. 
184  See, eg, Penelope Matthew, ‘Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa’ 
(2002) 96(3) American Journal of International Law 661; Peter Mares, Borderline: 
Australia's Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (UNSW Press, 2002); C Steven, 
‘Asylum-Seeking in Australia’ (2002) 36(3) International Migration Review 864. 
185  The argument might be made that Australia fails to afford to refugees certain ICCPR rights 
that it accords to citizens and nationals. Given the scope of art 26, this argument may also be 
extended to the provisions of the ICESCR and other IHRL instruments. 
186  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, 37th sess, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994) [7]. 
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The HRC has not issued detailed guidance on what constitutes an 
‘other status’,187 but has noted that art 26 provides protection against 
discrimination ‘whenever laws differentiating among groups or categories 
of individuals do not correspond to objective criteria’.188 It has indicated 
that States may permissibly treat a class differently from another whose 
‘status’ is relevantly ‘distinguishable’.189 
As mode of arrival is not an enumerated ground capable of giving rise 
to discrimination under the ICCPR, any potential argument would rely on 
it being caught by the ‘other status’ provision. The issue was not 
determined by the HRC in A v Australia,190 and the position remains 
unclear. It is difficult to see how differentiation based on mode of arrival 
can be said to rest upon objective criteria. There appears to be no rational 
reason why these refugees are any less deserving of permanent protection 
than offshore refugees. Overtaking the pre-selection of offshore refugees 
for resettlement, the dominant pattern of refugee flow has today become 
the ‘unplanned and unauthorised arrival of refugees at state’s borders’.191 
Furthermore, in contrast to offshore refugees, asylum seekers who 
physically arrive at the territory of a State directly engage the 
international obligations of that State.192 Academic analysis has also 
shown that the perception that onshore asylum seekers are ‘jumping the 
queue’ is unfounded, ostensibly due to the absence of such a queue.193 In 
short, mode of arrival is not a feature rendering the two groups relevantly 
‘distinguishable.’  
It follows that mode of arrival should be seen as discrimination on the 
basis of ‘other status’, removing the need to pursue an argument (under 
art 3 of the Refugee Convention) that the effect of Australian domestic 
law is to discriminate against a class of refugee based on their race or 
nationality. If this is correct, there is no need to address the debate about 
whether indirect (or effects-based) discrimination is covered by art 26. 
While the HRC has expressly adopted an indirect discrimination approach 
                                                
187  Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 771. 
188  Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 218/1986, 66th sess, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/66/D/786/1997 (29 July 1999) (‘Vos v Netherlands’) [1] (Messrs Aguilar Urbina 
and Wennergren). 
189  Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 658/1995, 60th sess, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/60/D/658/1995 (‘Van Oord v The Netherlands’) [8.5]. 
190  Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 560/1993, 59th sess, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (30 April 1997) (‘A v Australia’). This case concerned a 
Cambodian asylum seeker who alleged that Australia had violated his ICCPR rights by 
keeping him in immigration detention for more than four years. The HRC held that Australia 
had violated art 9 of the ICCPR. 
191  Hathaway, above n 89, 157. 
192  Crock, above n 90, 279; Mansouri, Leach and Nethery, above n 122, 137. 
193  See, eg, Billings, above n 32, 304 citing S Taylor and B Rafferty-Brown, ‘Difficult 
Journeys: Accessing Refugee Protection in Indonesia’ (2010) 36(3) Monash University Law 
Review 138. 
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in some communications,194 it has focused on the formally neutral 
application of laws in others.195 
On this basis it could be argued that Australia’s treatment of 
unauthorised arrivals is discriminatory. However, the HRC has noted that 
differential treatment will not constitute discrimination if the criteria by 
which the distinction is made are ‘reasonable and objective and if the aim 
is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the [ICCPR].’196 It is not 
easy to use the existing case law to predict the future application of the 
‘reasonable and objective’ test.197 Hathaway points to the deference 
traditionally afforded to States to engage in differential treatment based 
upon non-citizen status, and posits that this would likely result in a 
finding of reasonable justification, thereby defeating the proposed 
claim.198  
For the reasons given above, it is unlikely that the distinction is 
‘reasonable and objective’. This conclusion can be further reinforced by 
reference to art 3 of the Refugee Convention. It has been said that art 3 
provides a presumption that the denial to a group of refugees of any rights 
guaranteed under the Refugee Convention to all refugees is not 
‘reasonable’.199 The question, then, is whether discrimination between 
groups of refugees is legitimate. There are a number of grounds that the 
Australian Government might, and has, relied upon to legitimise the 
distinction. 
It is often argued that discriminating against unauthorised refugees 
will have the effect of reducing the instances of asylum seekers 
undertaking dangerous maritime voyages, thereby saving lives. 200 
Another plausible argument might be that the irregular migration of 
unauthorised refugees directly contributes to and facilitates an illegal 
trade in people smuggling. The key point to note, however, is that both of 
these arguments presuppose that the TPV regime deters irregular 
migration. This was the purpose identified in the Statement of 
Compatibility: ‘the need to maintain the integrity of Australia‘s migration 
system and encouraging the use of regular migration pathways to enter 
Australia’. Even on the assumption that that purpose is legitimate because 
                                                
194  See, eg, Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 998/2001, 78th sess, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/998/2001 (‘Althammer v Austria’) [10.2]. 
195  See, eg, Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 418/1990, 49th sess, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/418/1990 (1993) (‘Araujo-Jongen v The Netherlands’); Human Rights 
Committee, Views: Communication No 218/1986, 66th sess, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/66/D/786/1997 (29 July 1999) (‘Vos v Netherlands’); Human Rights Committee, 
Views: Communication No 477/1991, 50th sess, UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/477/1991 (1994) 
(‘JAMB-R v The Netherlands’); Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 
478/1991, 48th sess, UN Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/478/1991 (1993) (‘APL-v dM v The 
Netherlands’); see further the materials cited at Joseph and Castan, above n 187, 779–781. 
196  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18: Non-discrimination, 37th sess, UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 26 (1994) [13]. 
197  Joseph and Castan, above n 187, 781. 
198  Hathaway, above n 89, 258. 
199  Ibid 257–8. 
200  See, eg, Billings, above n 32, 295.  
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the UNHCR has so accepted,201 it is still possible to argue that the means 
employed by Australia to achieve the legitimate aim are not 
proportionate. As outlined in Part V below, the deterrence rationale is 
undermined by the application of the second TPV regime to a group of 
asylum seekers already present in Australia, with retrospective effect.  
Therefore, the advent of the second TPV regime negates any rational 
argument that Australia’s distinction is reasonable and objective, pursuant 
to a purpose which is legitimate under the ICCPR. Australia’s TPV 
regime may well constitute unlawful discrimination under art 26 of the 
ICCPR, when read with art 3 of the Refugee Convention. Having dealt 
with two challenges to the TPV regime under international law, the 
argument that TPVs constitute an unlawful penalty can now be 
considered. 
V  Unlawful Penalty 
Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention provides that: 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where 
their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are 
present in their territory without authorization, provided they present 
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their 
illegal entry or presence. 
Those refugees subjected to Australia’s second TPV regime may be 
exposed to an unlawful penalty within the meaning of art 31. Arguments 
to this effect were made in the context of the first regime.202 Edwards, for 
example, has noted that the term ‘penalty’ may have a broad meaning in 
art 31, extending to the denial of certain benefits vis-à-vis other refugees, 
and cites Executive Committee Conclusions to support this.203 In a similar 
vein, Billings has argued that ‘treating boat arrivals less favourably than 
air arrivals (for reasons that are irrelevant to their protection needs) is 
tantamount to ‘penalising’ them on account of their illegal entry’.204  
A  Scope of Article 31 
Academic and judicial opinion suggests that art 31’s application to 
‘refugees’ extends to asylum seekers as well as recognised refugees.205 At 
                                                
201  UNHCR, Conclusions Adopted By The Executive Committee on The International 
Protection of Refugees, 1975 – 2008 (Conclusion No. 1 – 109), No. 97 (LIV) (2003): 
Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures. 
202  See, eg, Mansouri and Leach, above n 9, 105; Kneebone, above n 90, 719–20. 
203  Alice Edwards, ‘Tampering with Refugee Protection: The Case of Australia’ (2003) 15 
International Journal of Refugee Law 192, 197–9. 
204  Billings, above n 32, 296. The second TPV regime has extended the ‘penalisation’ to 
unauthorised air arrivals as well as unauthorised maritime arrivals. This ‘penalisation’ 
constitutes the unfavourable treatment afforded to these groups in the form of TPVs. 
205  R v Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Adimi [1999] 4 All ER 520, 527 (Simon Brown 
LJ); Alimas Khaboka v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1993] Imm AR 484, 
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any rate, given that TPVs are only granted to those unauthorised asylum 
seekers (arriving by air or by sea) who are subsequently recognised as 
refugees, art 31 applies to them.  
Article 31 provides protection for refugees ‘coming directly’ from a 
territory of persecution. The scope of this requirement is contentious. 
Hathaway notes that there is a consensus that the ‘coming directly’ 
requirement does not authorise penalisation on the basis of brief periods 
of time spent in other safe countries before arrival in a contracting 
State.206 In the leading English case, R v Uxbridge Magistrates’ Court; Ex 
parte Adimi, the main touchstones by which exclusion from art 31 
protection on this ground should be judged were said to be ‘the length of 
stay in the intermediate country, the reasons for delaying there … and 
whether or not the refugee sought or found there protection de jure or de 
facto from the persecution they were fleeing’.207  
For Hathaway, the requirement excludes from protection those 
refugees who enter a State unlawfully simply because they have been 
unable to find permanent protection in the country of first asylum.208 
Goodwin-Gill has said that article 31 applies to ‘persons who have briefly 
transited other countries, who are unable to find protection in the first 
country or countries to which they flee, or who have 'good cause' for not 
applying in such country or countries’.209 This ‘good cause’ requirement 
(discussed below) allows consideration of the refugee’s circumstances in 
the third country.210 Noll contends for a wider interpretation, that such 
protection is lost by those ‘who have been accorded refugee status and 
lawful residence in a transit State to which they can safely return.’211 A 
2001 UNHCR expert roundtable concluded that ‘immunity from penalty 
should not apply to refugees who found asylum, or who were settled, 
temporarily or permanently, in another country.’212 
                                                                                                       
489; Guy S Goodwin-Gill, ‘Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees: Non-Penalization, Detention, and Protection’ in E Feller, V Turk and F Nicholson 
(eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 185, 193; Hathaway, above n 
89, 389; Gregor Noll, ‘Article 31 (Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge)’ in 
Andreas Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2011) 1243, 1253. 
206  Hathaway, above n 89, 394. 
207  [1999] 4 All ER 520, 527–8 (Simon Brown LJ) ('Adimi’); this was also quoted in R v 
Zanzoul (No. 2) [2006] CA 297/06 (NZ) and R v Asfaw [2008] AC 1061. 
208  Hathaway, above n 89, 396. 
209  Goodwin-Gill, above n 205, 218 quoted in R v Asfaw [2008] AC 1061, 1083–4 [19] (Lord 
Bingham). 
210  Ibid 194; Hathaway, above n 89, 397. 
211  Noll, above n 205, 1257. 
212  ‘Expert Roundtable, Geneva’ in E Feller, V Turk and F Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection 
in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) 253, 255 [10(c)] quoted in R v Asfaw [2008] AC 1061, 
1093–4 [50] (Lord Hope). 
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The role of transit countries is well established in irregular 
international migration today.213 A particularly important example is 
Indonesia, which has been recognised as a ‘quintessential transit 
migration country’214 for asylum seekers seeking to reach Australia since 
the wave of Indo-Chinese boat people in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.215 
Before undertaking the maritime voyage to Australia, asylum seekers 
arrive in Indonesia in a variety of ways. Some travel there directly, while 
others seek passage through Malaysia or Thailand.216 However, it is not 
possible to deny the protection of art 31 based on a temporary stay in 
Indonesia, given that it is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention.  
Although certain other countries that asylum seekers pass through en 
route to Australia are signatories to the Refugee Convention, asylum 
seekers subject to the new TPV regime will likely be able to show ‘good 
cause’ for illegally entering Australia. Courts have accepted as reasonable 
decisions not to seek asylum in transit countries that were not secure, did 
not respect basic human rights, were culturally or linguistically foreign to 
the refugee, or in which they lacked social/familial connections.217 It is 
submitted that unauthorised asylum seekers who are eventually granted 
TPVs do not meet the high threshold required to forfeit the protection of 
art 31 on this ground. 
In construing art 31, guidance might be drawn from domestic 
jurisprudence concerning the seven day rule,218 or the High Court’s 
judgment in Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship.219 In that case, the High Court interpreted the requirement 
that a country provide ‘protection’ to refugees. While French CJ referred 
to the key protection being protection from refoulement,220 the plurality 
referred more broadly to Australia’s obligations under the Refugee 
Convention, as did Heydon J (albeit with more caution).221 Even on the 
narrower approach, it is likely that most but not necessarily all non-
signatory transit States would fail to meet the threshold of providing 
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protection from refoulement. 222  However, it is important that in 
construing art 31, regard is had to its status as international law, and its 
unique aims and objectives. Domestic jurisprudence should not 
necessarily be determinative. 
It is a further requirement of art 31 that the refugees ‘enter or are 
present in their territory without authorisation.’ The exclusion of the 
Australian mainland and islands from the migration zone cannot be used 
to argue that entry or presence in State territory is not satisfied, as it is 
well-established that territory-based norms of international law are 
assessed with respect to a State’s territory under international law rather 
than some other means of unilateral definition such as a migration 
zone.223 Even where such asylum seekers are intercepted by State 
authorities in the course of an entry attempt, the refugee will be protected 
under art 31 as long as the interception is attributable to the State under 
international law.224 ‘Without authorisation’ is to be judged by domestic 
Australian law and is clearly satisfied in the case of refugees granted 
TPVs. 
Article 31 also requires refugees to ‘present themselves without delay 
to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.’  
There is no doubt that the entry or presence is ‘illegal’.225 Although the 
relevant asylum seekers are intercepted before they can present to the 
authorities without delay, there is an exception where a ‘refugee is 
arrested or detained before he or she could reasonably be expected to seek 
regularisation of status’.226 
With respect to the requirement that refugees show good cause for 
their illegal entry or presence, Goodwin-Gill argues that refugee status 
due to a well-founded fear of persecution is sufficient.227 On the other 
hand, the non-redundancy rule suggests that being a refugee in itself is 
not sufficient,228 as art 31 already contains a separate requirement that 
persons be Convention refugees.229 Hathaway charts a middle path, 
noting that art 31 requires that protection from penalties be reserved for 
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refugees ‘whose illegal entry is the result of some form of compulsion.’230 
Flight from persecution is one possible ‘good cause’.231 
On this approach, the refugee has to show good cause as to why their 
entry or presence was illegal rather than legal; that is, why it was not 
regularised beforehand.232 Unauthorised asylum seekers seeking to enter 
Australia would likely be able to show that it was impossible to obtain 
authorised entry or presence, or that it would increase the risk of 
persecution.233 As discussed above, they would likely also be able to 
demonstrate that they were unable to obtain asylum (or effective 
protection) in a transit country. 
B  Effect of Article 31 
Unauthorised asylum seekers recognised as refugees and granted TPVs 
may have come directly from a territory where they fear persecution, and 
may be able to show ‘good cause’ for their illegal entry or presence in 
Australia. They may therefore fall within the scope of art 31. The 
question then is whether TPVs themselves, which are imposed on account 
of illegal entry or presence, constitute an unlawful ‘penalty’ within art 31. 
Arguments have been made, based on the French language version of 
the Convention’s inclusion of the term ‘sanctions pénales’ and case 
law, 234  that the term ‘penalties’ should be confined to criminal 
penalties.235 However, the term ‘penalties’, in the English text, is capable 
of a wider interpretation. Where there is a difference between the English 
and French texts,236 and that difference cannot be resolved by the 
application of ordinary treaty interpretation principles,237 ‘the meaning 
which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of 
the treaty’ must be adopted.238  Goodwin-Gill, relying on parallel 
deliberations of the HRC,239 and the work of scholars,240 argues that a 
wider interpretation ought to be adopted to suit the object and purpose of 
the Refugee Convention.241  
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Hathaway has also argued for a broad interpretation, namely that 
penalty connotes a ‘loss inflicted for violation of a law’,242 and that art 31 
prohibits the imposition on refugees of ‘any detriment for reasons of their 
unauthorised entry or presence’.243 Furthermore, the English Social 
Security Commissioner has accepted as a penalty ‘any treatment that was 
less favourable than that accorded to others … unless objectively 
justifiable on administrative grounds’.244 This is in line with the 
Executive Committee Conclusion that asylum seekers should ‘not be 
penalised or exposed to any unfavourable treatment solely on the ground 
that their presence in the country is considered unlawful’.245 The Supreme 
Court of Canada has also recently endorsed a similar broad 
interpretation.246 
If this broad interpretation of ‘penalty’ is adopted, it is likely that 
TPVs do constitute a form of penalty in violation of art 31. As Parts III 
and IV of this article have sought to demonstrate, TPVs are certainly a 
form of ‘less favourable’ treatment for unauthorised asylum seekers who 
are subsequently recognised as refugees than that received by those who 
were authorised to come to Australia in the first place. This leads to the 
conclusion that TPV-holders are unlawfully discriminated against under 
international law. In contrast to PPV-holders, TPV-holders are only 
granted three years stay after which they must re-establish their claim, 
and they are denied access to permanent protection. The very language 
used implies the imposition of a penalty — the inverse of ‘no advantage’ 
is disadvantage.247 TPV-holders are also denied certain economic and 
social rights — for example, they are denied the right to family 
reunification, and it has been established that this has adverse effects on 
the mental and physical health of such refugees. Such treatment can 
constitute a penalty.248 
It is further submitted that there are differences between the first and 
second TPV regime that tend to strengthen this argument. That is, there 
are grounds for suggesting that TPVs under the second regime are 
decidedly more punitive than the first. As noted above, there is no avenue 
for TPV-holders to obtain permanent protection in Australia, other than 
the very limited opportunity of a SHEV. This is in stark contrast to the 
first regime, under which some refugees were eligible to transfer to PPVs. 
This lengthens (potentially indefinitely) the limitations on economic and 
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social entitlements, and the discriminatory treatment of these refugees. 
Furthermore, one of the primary justifications the Australian Government 
has provided for both the old 249 and new 250 TPV regimes is one of 
deterrence — specifically the deterrence of irregular migration, high-risk 
voyages and people smuggling. The Government has also emphasised the 
importance of maintaining the integrity of the immigration system and 
protection visa regime by promoting orderly migration.251 It is submitted 
that an examination of this rationale in the context of the second regime 
yields the inevitable conclusion that TPVs can only be explained as a 
punitive measure. 
Three factors support the conclusion that the deterrence justification 
does not logically support the second regime.252 First, as was made clear 
above, the main cohort subject to TPVs is the legacy caseload, which is in 
the process of lodging valid visa applications in Australia. Since the 
Regional Transfer and Resettlement policy became operational, all new 
maritime arrivals to Australia are processed and potentially resettled 
offshore. In effect, and as was argued by Labor and the Greens in 
opposing the reintroduction of TPVs, ‘[i]f TPVs are not to apply to any 
new arrivals in Australia … then TPVs cannot act as a deterrent. They 
will only apply to a cohort which is already in Australia’.253 Second, 
while TPVs under the first regime were of prospective effect only, the 
second regime operates retrospectively. It applies to a cohort of refugees 
already present in the country, and the accompanying conversion regime 
converts any existing PPV applications into TPV applications. Third, 
mention must be made of the empirical arguments made in the context of 
the first regime (which may still be applicable) that any decrease in boat 
arrivals is attributable not to the TPV policy but to the naval blockade of 
Australia.254 
For these reasons, it is doubtful that the second TPV regime can be 
justified solely on the grounds of deterrence, and there does not appear to 
be any ‘objective justification on administrative grounds’ for such a 
regime.255 Indeed, it has been suggested that, much like the 2001 
amendments to the TPV regime promulgated by the Howard Government, 
the second TPV regime imposes ‘punishment for punishment’s sake’.256  
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VI  Conclusion 
Despite a turbulent past laden with criticism, Australia’s TPV policy lives 
on. Not only do the concerns regarding the legality of TPVs under 
international law that plagued the first regime apply equally to the 
second, it also suffers from additional potential defects. The current 
regime unlawfully interferes with the rights of refugees to mental and 
physical health, and to family reunification. These negative effects are 
exacerbated in the second regime by the inability of TPV-holders to 
access permanent protection, other than through the limited possibility of 
acquiring a SHEV. Furthermore, the fact that the stated aim of deterrence 
cannot rationally sustain and support the second regime strengthens the 
argument that the policy is unlawfully discriminatory pursuant to the 
ICCPR, read in conjunction with the Refugee Convention. These same 
characteristics also render the second regime more overtly punitive than 
the first. 
The test for compliance with Australia’s international law obligations 
is ‘whether, in the light of domestic law and practice [it] has attained the 
international standard of reasonable efficacy and efficient implementation 
of the treaty provisions concerned’.257 Australia has not yet met this 
standard. TPV-holders are stuck in three-year cycles of anxiety and 
uncertainty, they are deprived of fundamental human rights through the 
application of a discriminatory policy, and they are unlawfully penalised 
for seeking protection from persecution.  
If international law is truly to substitute its own protection for that 
which the refugee’s country of origin cannot provide, Australia must 
amend its asylum seeker and refugee policy to give effect to its 
obligations under international law. 
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